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Germany’s Policy towards Russia:  
New Wine in an Old Wineskin 
Ryszarda Formuszewicz 
The tougher tone in Germany’s policy towards Russia reflects changes in Berlin’s perception of the 
eastern giant and in its own self-perception as a power willing to play a more active international role. 
This readiness for leadership could cement Germany’s status as a key international player whilst 
handing it the influence necessary to secure its own primary economic interests vis-à-vis Russia. 
However, it will also require Germany to critically address the long-standing premises of its policy 
towards Russia, and its appetite to overturn old assumptions remains limited. Lessons drawn by 
Germany now, in particular with regards to the causes of the Ukraine crisis, will prevail as a guideline 
for its Russia policy, and as such will also be decisive in the prospects for Polish–German cooperation. 
With German Power Comes German Responsibility 
Germany is a leader on EU economic policy but is facing greater expectations in foreign policy, too. During 
the recent Munich Security Conference, when leading German politicians delivered speeches signalling 
greater readiness for international engagement, they hardly expected that the first serious test for this new 
active foreign policy would emanate in Ukraine shaken by domestic protest. Even if Germany has played  
a lead role in Europe’s eastern policy before then, crisis management in Eastern Europe—inevitably 
involving Russia—is hardly its preferred direction. What these politicians had in mind presumably was 
rather Africa or other distant areas of conflict, especially given the subtext of their speeches—the need to 
oil the dysfunctional Franco–German engine. 
Germany is nevertheless become accustomed to its new power and influence. A significant characteristic of 
this international leadership role seems indeed to be a new assertiveness towards Russia. If Gerhard 
Schröder sought close and consensual relations with Russia, it was to provide leverage for Germany to play 
in the premier league; now, though, Berlin feels strong enough to diversify its role beyond simply 
advocating Russian interests on the European stage (if congruent with German priorities). This new self-
confidence is manifested in a more critical assessment of Russian action, and a competitive element in 
bilateral relations is becoming more visible. The Cyprus “bail-in” in 2013 has shown that when vital 
interests diverge, Germany is ready to play against Russia. 
Whilst this mantle of leadership certainly explains the shift to tougher rhetoric on the part of Germany, old 
habits die hard. During the first stage of the Ukraine crisis, Germany looked upon Russia as something akin 
to a “sparring partner,” as equal interlocutors with competing interests, so they were not engaged in real 
confrontation and precautions of some sort were taken to protect the participants. Thus, Ukraine was not 
prioritised in German policy and became a pawn in complex trade-offs, including other bilateral or 
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multilateral issues, in particular, security issues such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan or developments in 
Syria and Iran. Indeed, Russia was the defining factor in Germany’s stance towards the Ukraine crisis from 
the very beginning, affecting Berlin’s foreign and European policy at every step. Only with the Russian grab 
for Crimea did that finally change. With much more at stake, the responsibilities of leadership status 
rocketed. 
German Theory Meets Reality 
There is a parallel between the Merkel-II government of 2009–2013 and the current grand coalition: both 
have had to match their lofty ideas with an ugly reality. Between 2009 and 2013, the critical situation in 
Greece and the proliferation of the eurozone crisis challenged the fundaments of the Christian Democrat 
party’s identity, pitting an instinct for cooperation in Europe against a growing dissatisfaction with the 
quality of Germany’s partners. It was this that led to a growing readiness to accept the mantle of leadership 
in the EU. Now, the Social Democrats, having joined the CDU/CSU in government with a clear mission to 
improve relations with Russia, are seeing their intellectual heritage, Ostpolitik, put to the test. 
The coalition agreement reflects long-standing SPD preferences towards Russia,1 expressing an intention to 
renew what has been traditionally good communication channels. And, shortly after the government took 
office, visible steps were taken in this direction, not least with the nomination of the reputedly Russia-
friendly Gernot Erler, as coordinator for inter-societal cooperation with Russia, the Eastern Partnership 
and Central Asia countries, who replaced Andreas Schockenhoff, who had been openly critical towards 
Russia. But just as the CDU/CSU had to rethink and then to act, so too did the SPD. And the presence of 
the SPD in government made the tougher tone towards Russia stronger and more credible as with it there 
is no doubt that everything has been tried to avoid the confrontation. 
This tougher stance towards Russia was, however, facilitated by long-term trends. Most notably, the 
bilateral relationship has leaked out of the strictly intergovernmental sphere and into the popular arena. 
Thus German–Russian affairs are no longer confined to the economic (and high cultural) sphere but have 
broached issues of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and Berlin must take into account popular 
sentiment. The regular Deutschlandtrend survey shows that this is hardening. In March 2014, only 15% of 
respondents perceived Russia as a “reliable partner”2 (in 2008, after the war in Georgia, it was 34%). This 
shift is partly down to the Arab Spring of 2011, which underlined popular scepticism towards the idea of 
soft-soaping autocratic leaders. But it also reflects scepticism towards Russian President Vladimir Putin. He 
is seen as democratic by just 8% of respondents (showing that the lupenreiner Demokrat narrative of the 
Schröder era is bankrupt) while 75% expressed distrust in him.3 
As for Germany’s political and economic elites themselves, disappointment about Russia’s internal 
development, the long-term prospect of reducing Germany’s reliance on Russian energy imports 
(Energiewende), and Russia’s decreasing economic attractiveness have all prepared the ground for a shift 
(ongoing but open-ended) in the significance of Russia in Berlin’s mental map. Germany had always stuck to 
the principle of cooperation instead of confrontation with Russia, and of inclusion instead of exclusion. 
Now, though, Germany sees Russia as a spoiler.4 An attempt to solve the frozen Transnistria conflict in 
2010 by encouraging Russia to contribute brought limited results, and the Russian approach to the Syrian 
crisis since 2011 has been followed by criticism, even if the initiative to remove the regime’s chemical 
weapons is appreciated. The annexation of Crimea finally confounded the German belief in Russia’s 
                                                          
 
1 R. Mützenich, “Außenpolitik mit sozialdemokratischer Handschrift. Die Ergebnisse der Arbeitsgruppe ‘Außenpolitik, 
Verteidigungspolitik, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Menschenrechte’ aus sozialdemokratischer Sicht,” IPG Journal, www.ipg-
journal.de. 
2 For comparison, Poland was cited by 63% as a “reliable partner,” and the United States—under criticism because of the NSA 
scandal—received 38%. 
3 ARD-DeutschlandTrend, “Solidarität mit der Ukraine,” 6 March 2014, www.tagesschau.de. 
4 “Debate on government statement,” Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht. 20. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 13. März 
2014; “Debate on the government statement before the European Council on 20/21 March 2014”, Deutscher Bundestag, 
Stenografischer Bericht, 23. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 20. März 2014. 
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willingness to cooperate on international security. Nevertheless, the old dogma of German foreign policy—
that security could be achieved only by engaging, and not excluding Russia remains valid. 
Seeing their instinct for cooperation challenged by reality, German politicians have come to understand that 
their options to influence Russia are very limited. This is one reason for why Germany has proved ready to 
flex its new economic power. While German business is against the idea of imposing sanctions,5 decision-
makers seem convinced that Europe (or at least Germany) is able to endure the pain, contrary to Russia. 
And yet, there is a question whether (re-)gaining the ability to influence Russia will return as a primary aim 
for Berlin, encouraging Germany to take the quasi-mediator position between the EU/West and Russia and 
pushing Germany back onto a conciliatory path even at the expense of its relations with other partners and 
allies. 
In Search of the “True” Roots of the Crisis 
The ongoing German debate on Crimea, on Russia and on Eastern policy is focused on crisis management, 
in particular on the questions of the adequate response to Russia’s excesses and what costs would there be 
for the German economy. But there is also a more fundamental discussion about the reasons for the 
conflict. That strand becomes louder, especially because economic circles increase the pressure for 
business-friendly relations.6 Moreover, the outcome of this debate could well push Germany back onto its 
traditional path. This is because its proponents are disinterring three historic moves that fans of a more 
conciliatory line view as mistakes: the eastward expansion of NATO, the West’s insufficient recognition of 
Russian concessions, and the EU’s mismanagement of the Eastern Partnership. 
According to widespread opinion in Germany, the West pledged during the course of German reunification 
not to expand NATO eastwards.7 When expansion nevertheless went ahead, and when in 2007 
Washington proposed a missile-defence shield,8 Russia felt deceived and increasingly encircled. This broken-
pledge argument is used chiefly by the opposition (Gregor Gysi and his Left Party) and is often referred to 
during media debates and interviews. The argument persists although the documents concerning German 
re-unification have been declassified and the existence of any such promise has been ruled out.9 It is echoed 
in opinions that NATO enlargement fundamentally harms Russia’s security interest and that the 1999 and 
2004 expansions of the North Atlantic alliance were premature, hasty and clumsy. In this argument, the 
perspective of new NATO Member States goes unrecognised. 
The next line of argumentation alleges a lack of accommodation for Russia, in particular with regard to the 
West’s expanding influence in the post-Soviet zone. Here the existence of numerous Western initiatives 
and overtures towards Russia are quite simply passed over. The cooperation between Russia and NATO is 
thus ignored as is the fact that Russia was not interested in cooperation with the EU within the 
Neighbourhood Policy framework, claiming special status. Recent EaP instruments and initiatives, according 
to this line of thought, should thus have been compensated for by adequate proposals for Russia. The 
prevalence of this argument is rather surprising given the sheer number of German-led initiatives for 
developing cooperation. 
                                                          
 
5 It is noteworthy that despite all known reservations and general resistance to economic sanctions within German economic 
circles, a leading representative of the German economy, Ulrich Grillo, president of BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), 
supported the chancellor on the introduction of economic sanctions if necessary as a commitment to the “primacy of policy.”  
6 The chief executive of Siemens met with Vladimir Putin on 26 March at the official residence outside Moscow, breaking ranks with 
the West in an attempt to enforce a change of course with the Russian leader. 
7 The argument of this pledge has been used by Russia during negotiations before the first round of NATO enlargement after the 
collapse of the Eastern bloc. It was said that there was a compromise between U.S. President George Bush and Soviet Premiere 
Mikhail Gorbachev. In Germany, the promise is seen to have been confirmed by the words of Hans-Dietrich Genscher. 
8 “The inclination to align mutual security interests was less marked. For example, the missile-defence project was pushed ahead 
without particular consideration for Russian sensibilities,” Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Euro-Atlantic Security: Before and after the 
‘Reset’,” in: W. Ischinger (ed.), Towards Mutual Security: Fifty Years of Munich Security Conference, Göttingen, 2014, p. 262. 
9 On the lack of any such agreement, see: M. Kramer, “The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia,” The Washington 
Quarterly, April 2009. 
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And finally, a third set of arguments criticizes the concept and conduct of the Eastern Partnership as  
a policy whose risk potential with Russia was not properly considered. The most important accusation 
here, shared by the Chancellor herself, is that Ukraine has been forced to make a choice between West 
and East, either/or (entweder/oder), without a proper assessment of the interdependencies between Ukraine 
and Russia.10 It is the European Commission that thus bears most blame for the current setback and is 
made responsible in part for the devastating outcome. Doubts have also been raised over the wisdom of 
the EU swiftly taking sides with the Ukrainian opposition.11 The question of how to involve Russia in 
constructive consultation without enabling it to block further developments remains unsolved and could 
lead towards regression in EU Eastern Policy. 
These three lines of argument uniformly ignore the ambivalent impact of Germany’s consensual approach 
towards Russia after reunification, even though the current international crisis comes down in part at least 
to Berlin’s “Russia first” policy, its preferences in the EU’s Eastern Policy, as well as decisions taken 
bilaterally with Russia. Indeed, Germany’s political elite actually feel their decision has been confirmed to 
block Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest NATO summit of 2008 
and the foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has again expressed opposition to Ukraine’s 
membership in the Alliance. Although there is increasing discussion about Germany’s energy dependency 
on Russia, the idea that the Nord Stream pipeline is a tool of Russian geopolitics has hardly been addressed. 
There is thus a high degree of sympathy for Russia’s traumas. Even Moscow’s historical explanations for its 
actions have been accepted, and few Germans seem to wonder how they would react if their own country 
cited an historical justification to “take back” Kaliningrad. It is no surprise, then, that the commentators 
highlighting the responsibility borne by Germany towards Russia because of WWII tend to ignore the same 
logic of responsibility towards Ukraine. It shows the resilience of the Ostpolitik doctrine, and its later 
incarnation “Partnership for modernization”—still a declared project in the coalition agreement: there is 
still an assumption that Russia can change and that Germany can help it. There is also a failure to recognise 
that Berlin’s “Russia-first” approach has in fact turned Germany into something of a brakeman when it 
comes to transforming Eastern Europe. 
Outlook: Old Flames Never Die? 
From the perspective of the CEE countries one of the most meaningful statements in the coalition 
agreement of the CDU, CSU and SPD reads as follows: “In shaping our relations with Russia, we want to 
take into account the legitimate interests of our mutual neighbours.”12 This sentence, which was included in 
the previous coalition agreement, has always left room for interpretation: what “interests” do the Germans 
consider “legitimate”? It seems the Crimea crisis has delivered some clarification: neighbours’ individual and 
joint desire for security in the face of a violation of international law. And yet, it is unclear how Germany’s 
respect for these interests will develop: decisive would be the follow-up and exit path towards  
a normalisation strategy with Russia after the crisis. 
The ruling coalition shows a degree of unity in its diagnosis and assessment of the Ukrainian crisis, but the 
operative conclusions for future policy decisions will need more reflection before they are elaborated, as 
clearly manifested through the criticism that came quickly after Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen 
supported an increased NATO presence on the external borders of the alliance.13 Germany’s political elite 
probably may duck the necessary critical debate concerning Ostpolitik, with this omission influencing policy 
                                                          
 
10 See: “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zum Europäischen Rat am 19./20. Dezember,” 18 December 2013, 
www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Regierungserklaerung/2013/2013-12-18-regierungserklaerung-bk-er.html;jsessionid=6C4347 
E744DF71CF90F5302B4C73F4D6.s1t2. 
11 See “On Ukraine, the EU has made too many misjudgements,” interview with Germany’s new Russia policy coordinator,  
Gernot Erler, 12 December 2013, IP Journal, www.ip-journal.dgap.org. 
12 “Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten, Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 18. Legislaturperiode,” signed on  
16 December 2013; non-official translation by Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, www.kas.de. 
13 “Von-der-Leyen-Vorschlag: Koalition streitet über Nato-Präsenz im Osten,” 23 March 2014, www.spiegel.de. 
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conduct and cooperation options. Simultaneously, Germany could be tempted to regain influence on Russia 
by sacrificing the effort to work out a joint position in the EU based on a broad agreement. 
The line Germany will take in Russia policy in the medium and long term depends on the way some key 
questions will be tackled. First, how will Germany position itself in the process and how will it address the 
compatibility challenge of the different roles it used to play in the EU relationship with Russia. If Germany is 
willing to maintain leadership on that issue, it should consider that the leadership mandate could be 
undermined by a simultaneous performance as a mediator between the EU (or the West) and Russia. 
Second, assuming there will be no further Russian escalation in Eastern Ukraine, what should be the visible 
effects of the legal non-recognition of Crimea’s annexation that would prove that it is not simply “business 
as usual.” And, third, bearing in mind that Europe witnessed the breach of the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine and that this violation continues, how should the “as well as” model (sowohl-als-auch) Germany is 
advocating for translate into political action?14 
Vivid Polish–German cooperation in EU eastern policy could contribute significantly to securing lasting EU 
interest in support for Ukraine, for the sake of stability foremost. This will be necessary not only in the 
medium and long term but also sooner, during the possible stand-by phase after the European elections and 
negotiations on handing out key functions. The Weimar triangle—which in a way returns to its origins—
could deliver on this particular issue, as now in encouraging reflection about the adjustment of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy.15 The necessary condition for it, however, is that Germany keeps to the 
inclusive approach in its leadership. 
 
 
                                                          
 
14 This approach was based on the assumption that the coexistence of EU (German and mostly economic) and Russian (foremost 
political and security) interests and influence is possible, but it was formulated at the time when the main objection towards Russia 
was that it exploited the difficult economic situation of Ukraine to discourage the country to sign an Association Agreement with 
the EU. No one would question the need to cooperate with Russia but the modus vivendi should reflect further developments. 
There is a risk that the proposed “bridging role” for Ukraine between the EU and Russia (see, for example, the CDU draft 
manifesto before the EP election) could simply turn into another “B” word—“buffer”—which would be not only not enough for 
transformation but also for the stabilisation process in the country. 
15 “Building a stronger compact with our neighbours: A new momentum for the European Neighbourhood Policy—Statement by 
the Foreign Ministers of the Weimar Triangle,” 1 April 2014. 
